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Abstract 
Strategic change is a topic of great importance given the turbulence of the markets in 
which firms operate. Related to this topic, it has recently been developed the concept of 
dynamic capabilities, which refers to the ability of companies to sustain their competitive 
advantage in changing environments. 
Often as a mean to cope with the challenges presented by the environments, 
companies hire outside CEOs in order to acquire new perspectives, capabilities and 
mindsets to improve company’s performance. 
This dissertation comprises a teaching case about Siemens. The longstanding 
corporation has a history of success but where there were also some threats to the 
sustainability of the company in the market. In this case, the main focus is on the period 
since 2007. In that period, Siemens hired the first outside CEO in its history and the 
crisis took place, putting to the test the endurance of the CEO and, ultimately, of the 
company.  
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Introduction  
 6 
Strategic management is a field of great importance in management studies as the 
environment is becoming more competitive and more volatile. Variables as technology, 
politics, demographics and even competition are sources of instability in the market that 
often cause shocks that completely shift the condition under which the company 
operates, demanding strategic change.  
Be that as it may, the topic of Dynamic Capabilities has gained increasing importance in 
the field of strategic management. This view emerged due to a limitation in the 
Resource-based Theory (Barney, 1986, 1991): the environment is dynamic in its nature 
instead of static as Barney assumed in his theory. Teece (1997) attempted to overcome 
this hurdle through the development of an article, triggering the work of several scholars 
(Barreto, 2010).  
The Resource-based Theory explains how to achieve a sustained competitive 
advantage, assuming that resources and capabilities are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms and that such conditions are stable over time (Barney, 1991). On the other 
hand, in his work, Teece et al. (1997:516) defined Dynamic Capabilities as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments”. 
Barreto (2010) also acknowledged the dynamic nature of the markets. In his definition of 
Dynamic Capabilities, Barreto (2010) considered it as a multidimensional construct: “A 
dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its 
propensity to sense opportunities and treats, to make timely and market-oriented 
decisions and to change its resource base”. 
Under this umbrella topic that is Strategic Change, there is a very interesting topic that 
often relates to Dynamic Capabilities which is CEO origin, tenure and discretion. When 
a company changes its CEO, the new CEO characteristics play an important role and 
ultimately affect the company performance (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2009). 
Furthermore, the impact of the decisions of an inside CEO versus an outside CEO on 
firm’s performance differs depending on the level and positive versus negative effect of 
strategic change (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2009). 
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This dissertation will focus on the Siemens case. From the World War II to the current 
crisis, many were the shocks that the 165-year old engineering giant faced. I will 
analyze major structural changes occurred in last decades, but a special emphasis will 
be given to recent restructurings occurred in the company. 
Over the years, many leaders headed the company to success. For over 100 years the 
company was run by Siemens family members and by 1968 the company began to be 
leaded by inside, (or promoted) CEOs. However, in 2007 the situation changed greatly: 
for the first time Siemens had an outside CEO. 
The dissertation is divided into Literature Review, Teaching Case, Teaching Note, 
Discussion and Conclusion. In the first, the theory will be presented to frame the 
Teaching Case. After the Teaching Case, the Teaching Note will provide a 
comprehensive guide to class discussion of theoretical topics and case study. Finally, 
the last two sections will feature the Discussion and Conclusion parts to complete the 
dissertation.  
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Literature Review  
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The Emergence of Dynamic Capabilities 
The Strategic Management field has been greatly developed in the last few years. In 
fact, nowadays markets operate in situations much more challenging as the occurrence 
of sudden shocks in economies, competition, technology and regulation is more 
frequent (Barreto, 2010). Therefore, this instability results in a difficulty in sustaining a 
long-term competitive advantage, which, in turn, has been proved to be decreasing its 
longevity (Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). 
Indeed, the realization that firms operate in changing markets enabled to overcome the 
limitations of the Porter’s Five Forces Model and the Resource-based Theory (Barney, 
1986, 1991). The former, assesses the industry attractiveness and, thus, the likelihood 
of thriving in a certain industry, while the latter, on the contrary, considers that superior 
returns lie in the resources and capabilities of the corporation, privileging internal 
resources in detriment of external context. However, both assumed that market 
conditions are relatively stable over time, hence the emergence of Dynamic 
Capabilities. 
The Dynamic Capabilities’ concept became popular when Teece et al. (1997:516) 
defined Dynamic Capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments”. The 
work of the scholars had an undeniable impact, prompting the work of many others and 
leveraging the importance of the topic in the strategic management field. Nonetheless, 
the definition was criticized by many scholars due to its vagueness (Kraatz & Zajac, 
2001), confusing (Winter, 2003) and tautological (Williamson, 1999) nature among 
others. 
Resource Reconfiguration and Dynamic Capabilities 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) made an important contribution to the study of Dynamic 
Capabilities. Considering the firm’s processes that use resources as the foundation of 
market change, Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) defined Dynamic Capabilities as “the 
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organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configuration 
as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die”.  
Menguc & Auh, 2006 was also of great relevance to the development of the Dynamic 
Capabilities’ topic. The scholars also privileged the role of internal capabilities as a 
mean to neutralize external threats (Menguc & Auh, 2006). Yet, under the proposition 
that superior competitive advantage lies in the effective implementation of market 
orientation (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993), innovativeness plays an important role in this 
model, as it is believed to have a positive and significant interaction with market 
orientation. Thus, the ability to respond to changing environments will be improved 
should it be complemented by other internal transformational resources.  
The new definition of Dynamic Capabilities: a multidimensional construct 
Since it became a popular topic, Dynamic Capabilities have had a large array of 
definitions and, even though the previously mentioned definitions relied on the resource 
configuration as a mean to achieve a sustained competitive advantage, many authors 
believed otherwise. According to Barreto (2010) the different definitions varied in nature, 
specific role, relevant context, creation and development mechanisms, heterogeneity 
assumptions, outcomes and purpose. 
Barreto (2010) considered imperative to take into account the previous criticisms and 
the most recent theoretical and empirical developments. Hence, the new definition 
comprised four dimensions: “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically 
solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make 
timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base”. Hence, Barreto 
(2010) considered that a multidimensional construct would grasp the complexity of 
Dynamic Capabilities, as the four dimensions are distinct yet related in a single concept. 
Strategic Change 
Strategic change is the intended intermediate outcome of dynamic capabilities. It often 
comes as a result of a firm’s response in the context of a shock. In some studies, it has 
been defined as a shift in a single and specific strategic dimension (Zhang & 
 11 
Rajagopalan, 2009), such as product diversification level (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) or 
investment intensity (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). However, many other scholars consider 
strategic change as the overall change in a firm’s pattern of resource allocation in 
multiple key strategic dimensions (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009; Carpenter, 2000; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 2006). The latter approach is based on the idea 
that strategic change is based on the perspective that reckons strategy as the 
configuration in a firm’s resource allocation (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Strategic Change and CEO Origin 
Managerial succession epitomizes the periodic occasion to reconfigure the company’s 
strategy and structure to the changing requirements of environments (Miller & Friesen, 
1980; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Tushman, Virany, and Romanelli, 1985). Indeed, the 
topic of CEO origin has been drawing significant attention as the situation often also 
underlies strategic change. In fact, Zhang & Rajagopalan (2009) have shown that 
having an outside CEO (hired from outside the firm) versus an inside CEO (promoted 
from within the firm) differs the level of strategic change and performance attained by 
the firm. Since inside CEOs have accumulated knowledge of the firm acquired through 
their experience on the business and outside CEOs bring new knowledge and ideas 
(Harris and Helfat, 1997; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2003, 2004), the strategy formulation 
and implementation is likely to be different, resulting in different outcomes, which, 
ultimately, have a different impact in company’s performance.  
Outside CEOs are often hired in a situation of performance decline and, thus, changes 
are needed (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993). As CEOs bring new skills, are more 
emotionally detached and have less concerns related to the company’s status quo, they 
are more prone to look for irreverent strategic options (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009). 
Hence, relative to the promoted CEOs, outside CEOs may be more adaptive yet can 
also intensify the disruptive effect of strategic change (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009). 
Therefore, the costs and risks associated with strategic change are higher in the case of 
outside CEOs. 
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In what concerns strategic change endured by the two types of leaders, Zhang & 
Rajagopalan (2009) realized that, in the case of outside CEOs relative to promoted 
CEOs, the increases in performance are greater in the case of low levels of strategic 
change, while the opposite effect occurs in high levels of strategic change. This 
situation can be justified by the fact that, as promoted CEOs are very acquainted to the 
companies resources and capabilities, they try to capitalize on these, acting in a 
continuous way, which is biased by they prior experiences. However, this situation is not 
applicable in the early years of tenure (about three years) as some degree of change is 
anticipated (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009). 
The strategic change topic has been proving to be very important to understand the 
strategic management of the companies. Although seemingly unrelated, the topics of 
Dynamic Capabilities and CEO turnover fit under the strategic change topic, which will 
be illustrated in a teaching case in the following chapter. 
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Teaching Case  
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The Winds of Change at Siemens 
160 years of History 
It was on October 12th, 1847 that Werner von Siemens and Johann Georg Halske along 
with eight employees began the production of pointer telegraphs, on the company 
founded by the two: the Telegraph Construction Company of Siemens & Halske. 
Indeed, the company’s main source of income was telegraphs for many decades, 
having won the contract to build the first long–distance telegraph line in Europe: a 500-
km line connecting Berlin to Frankfurt, in the year after its establishment. 
After eight years of activity in the home country and abroad, Siemens & Halske decided 
to open their first foreign subsidiary in Russia, where the company expanded the 
national telegraph network. This subsidiary was managed by Carl von Siemens, the 
youngest brother of Werner. 
In 1866, Werner von Siemens discovered the dynamo-electric principal, which enabled 
the idea of the use of electricity as a cost-effective power source. The groundbreaking 
discovery paved the way for private and public electrification. At this point, the company 
already realized how important it was to have qualified and experienced employees1, 
thus, implementing pension funds, reducing the working hours and providing apprentice 
training programs and onward training2. 
A few years later, the company introduced the first electrical railway with an external 
power supply as well as many innovations related to lighting and drive technology, 
positioning the company as a pioneer in electric engineering. Simultaneously, in an 
attempt to strengthen the company’s position in its key markets, while capitalizing on 
the sales volume that it reached by then, Siemens & Halske opened agencies in several 
countries. 
At the end of the 19th century, the company started a period of growth characterized by 
consolidation and partnerships. In China, the company built an electrical plant, which 
supplied power to several cities and run the rail system. Shortly after, the company 
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opened its first agency in Shanghai. Already in the beginning of the 20th century, the 
company’s heavy current divisions merge with the joint-stock corporation Schuckert & 
Co. to form Siemens-Schuckertwerke GmbH. Also in 1903, Siemens also co-founded a 
company with AEG specialized in developing the radio. 
The World War I had a strong and lasting impact on the company, causing the collapse 
of the markets and the expropriation of foreign subsidiaries3. The losses accounted for 
40% of the capital, including nearly all its foreign patent rights. Hence, the priorities of 
the company included the restructuring of the company’s manufacturing operations and 
the recovery of the business abroad4. At this point, Carl Friedrich von Siemens, the 
youngest son of Werner von Siemens, was in charge of the business, establishing a 
clear vision for the company on this period: to focus on the whole field of electrical 
engineering but assigning specific areas of the business to subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies. 
In the middle of the 1920’s, the company attained the largest foreign contract awarded 
to any German company since the beginning of the 20th century5. Siemens-
Schuckertwerke GmbH was responsible for the construction of a power plant in the Irish 
Free State, which would electrify the whole land of the country. 
Due to World War II, many civilians were forced to work in the German Industry. 
Siemens was included in this segment and, as such, more than 20% of the company’s 
employees were working against their will6. By the end of the war, many plants were 
ruined, therefore, the manufacturing operations were moved abroad to places not 
affected by the war, having 400 relocated manufacturing plants at the end of 1944 and 
at the beginning of the following year7. However, on April 20th, 1945, Siemens plants 
closed at the expense of Germany’s collapse, buildings and factories were ruined, 
accounting for a loss of 80% of company’s assets8. 
Once the war was over, it was time to regain momentum and achieve the successful 
position that the company held before the world tragedy. Thus, Siemens approach 
entailed programs that aimed at the reconstruction of public services and utilities. The 
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Group Directorates appointed during the war remained in charge of the west and south 
of Germany. Even though both had the same goal of recovering its position, the 
Directorates worked independently of the headquarters. 
As the domestic business grew, there was no apparent progress in sales abroad. It was 
not until the 1950’s that foreign sales started to grow, when the company regained its 
patents and trademarks’ rights as well as expropriated foreign companies. Siemens 
capitalized on these changes by restructuring its operations and formed new 
companies. The growth was visible in many large-scale projects in which Siemens was 
involved, so, by 1960’s Siemens had already achieved its position in the market9. 
In October 1966, Siemens & Halske AG, Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and Siemens-
Reiniger-Werke AG merged to form Siemens AG. This decision intended to bring 
together the company’s activities and competences to strengthen its position, as there 
was a clear convergence in the business of the companies10. Additionally, one internal 
restructuring had been made, which decentralized the power in an attempt to gain more 
flexibility and reduce the response time. Before the 1970’s the company had already 
reached 270,000 employees worldwide and annual sales over DM11 10 billion12. 
Once Germany was reunified, the eastern started to be developed by Siemens and in a 
few years the organization took over 11 companies and implemented a number of sales 
locations13. Also, as Central and Eastern Europe opened their markets, the company 
expanded its activity when it established projects in telecommunications, transportation 
systems, medical equipment and environmental protection14. 
In the early 1990’s, when the word “Globalization” started to become a big hit, the 
company adopted a new global approach, as the world became a sole market where 
country boundaries became less relevant. Productivity, innovation and growth were the 
keywords for this new approach15. Asia-Pacific and the U.S. were immediately 
considered key locations, so Siemens had a pressing presence in both. In 2001, 
Siemens attained a listing in the New York Stock Exchange. 
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160 years after the company’s inception, Siemens had built a global network of 
innovation, operating in a wide variety of sectors, connecting 450,000 people in over 
190 countries worldwide16, being known as the “global powerhouse in electronics and 
electric engineering”17. 
 
Faces of progress, faces of change 
Throughout Siemens history many important people helped developing and shaping the 
engineering giant. With different roles, the Siemens’s family, along with a few partners, 
was responsible for inventions, ideas, projects, international expansion and strategy.  
Werner von Siemens was an inventor and farsighted businessman whose 
achievements, through the foundation of Siemens, were very important for the 
development of the field of electrical engineering18. His brother Wilhelm, later Sir 
William, due to the English naturalization, was key to the internationalization of the 
corporation, especially in England19. While taking care of managerial endeavors, Sir 
William also embraced a research activity and published several articles20. 
On the other hand, Carl von Siemens, Werner’s youngest brother, established the 
company in the lucrative Russian market, where he dealt with large-scale projects. Carl 
was the successor of Werner in Siemens & Halske upon his brother retirement from 
management tasks21. He was, then, responsible for turning the organization into a 
public corporation22. 
Arnold and Wilhelm von Siemens were the two oldest sons of Werner von Siemens. 
Both of them were in charge of the management of the company with their uncle Carl.23 
The youngest son of the founder, Carl Friedrich von Siemens, played a major role in 
restructuring the company after World War I (when his brothers were already 
deceased)24. Visionary as his father, he defined the strategy that enabled the company 
to overcome the difficult political regimes in Germany, which ranged from disastrous 
losses to leadership in the industry25. 
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Ernst von Siemens, son of Carl Friedrich, also built remarkable milestones while 
working in the company. He was able to revive the international businesses after World 
War II with his cousin Hermann von Siemens, as he was also the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Siemens & Halske and Siemens-Schuckertwerke26. It was during 
his tenure that the merge of the companies into Siemens AG occurred27. 
At the end of the 1960’s the management of the company shifted to non-relatives of the 
Siemens family. Gerd Tacke was the first president of the Managing Board in 196828. 
His long career at the company and many years working alongside Ernst von Siemens, 
allowed him to share the views and, ultimately, fit the brief29. After leaving the Managing 
Board, Tacke was elected member of the Supervisory Board, a position which he held 
for six years.30 
Then, Bernhard Plettner succeeded in the Managing Board. With a career that began 
with an internship while in school and a career that entailed the restoration of the export 
business after World War II, Plettner achieved important landmarks as the head of the 
Planning Department of Siemens-Schuckertwerke and also as Chairman of the 
company31. Upon the restoration of the company into Siemens AG, Plettner became a 
member of the joint presidency. Later, Plettner was elected member of the Supervisory 
Board after his mandate in the Managing Board32. Indeed, in 1981, he became the first 
President of the Supervisory Board who was not related to the Siemens family33. 
Karlheinz Kaske took the lead after Plettner. Kaske joined the company in 1950 yet left 
three years after to be a lecturer at the School of Mines e Aachen.34 In 1960, he 
returned permanently. The Sales Engineer, whose experiences included working 
abroad to increase the company’s foreign business and shifting it from an electric to an 
electronic engineering company, became a member of the planning department that 
merged the companies into Siemens AG35. By 1975 Kaske was member of the 
managing board, having reached the position of chairman in 1981 and sustaining it for 
11 years. 
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Heinrich von Pierer filled the position of the President of the Managing Board. The 
economics graduate joined Siemens in 1969 after serving as an assistant professor at 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg36. At Siemens, his career started at the Legal 
department of Siemens AG but by 1977 he was working on the company’s subsidiary 
Kraftwerk Union AG, becoming the head of Business Administration in 198837. In the 
following year he was a member of the Managing Board of Siemens AG and in 1992 
Pierer was appointed President and CEO of Siemens AG38. Pierer remained in the 
position until 2005, when he became Chairman of the Supervisory Board39. While in the 
lead of the company, Pierer introduced the company to a globalized world, a company 
fit to survive a fierce global competition as well as a company that fulfills the 
shareholders’ expectations and needs. Hence, Pierer had a clear vision: should a 
company fail to match the expectations, there were five options: fix, buy, cooperate, sell 
or close. According to the CEO this was how the company could ensure a leading 
position in the market. Pierer remained in the chair until April 25th, 2007. 
In 2005, Klaus Kleinfeld replaced Heinrich von Pierer in the lead of Siemens AG. The 
former consultant and product manager of the Pharmaceutical Industry entered 
Siemens in 1987 for the Corporate Sales and Marketing Unit40. Kleinfeld moved to the 
the U.S., where he was appointed COO in 2001 and President and CEO of Siemens 
U.S. in 2002 due to his remarkable endeavor in the turnaround of this Regional 
Company. By 2004, Kleinfeld was member of the Corporate Executive Committee. In 
spite of being in the power for a mere couple of years, Klaus Kleinfeld impact was 
undeniable. During his tenure, he put into place the program Fit4more, which made the 
organization reach record-breaking figures, resulting in a 50% increase in company 
value41. 
At last, Peter Löscher. The Austrian economics graduate worked in consultancy for a 
few years. By 1988, he worked around the world for the Hoechst Group, whereas in 
2000 he was President and CEO of Aventis Pharma. In 2004, he was President of 
General Electric Healthcare and member of the Executive Board. Moreover, in 2006 
Löscher was President of Global human Health at Merck & Co. 2007 was the year when 
he entered Siemens to fill the vacant position of President and CEO of Siemens AG. For 
 20 
the first time, Siemens appointed a President that was neither German or had a long 
career in the company42. 
Restructuring – Take 1: A New Triad – Energy, Industry and Healthcare 
In Siemens’s history several organizational restructurings took place. On October 1st, 
1966 occurred the first major restructuring of the company, the merge of Siemens & 
Halske AG, Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG and Siemens-Reiniger-Werke AG to form 
Siemens AG43. Ernst von Siemens decided to put this idea into place given the 
convergence of the businesses of the companies. Thus, the existing structures were 
adapted to fit a wider portfolio44. With the aim of decentralizing the decision making 
power, decreasing the response time and increasing flexibility, the split into groups was 
adopted in 1969. For the next 20 years Siemens would have six operating groups (see 
Exhibit 3)45. 
The following structural change occurred in 198946. By this time, Siemens was seeking 
a closer relationship with the customer and more flexibility to tackle a now globalized 
and fiercely competitive market. Thus, the former units were divided into smaller 
standalone entities which would have an increased responsibility (see Exhibit 4). 
By 2004, following the portfolio adjustments that occurred overtime, Siemens had six 
groups (see Exhibit 5). Subsequent to the nomination of Kleinfeld as President and 
CEO, there was another structural change but now in the opposite direction: in 2006 
Siemens increased once again its number of operating groups to nine (see Exhibit 6). 
However, it was in 2008 that the biggest change occurred since the 1989 
restructuring47. 
Propelled by the entry of the new leader, on January of 2008 the number of operating 
groups was severely reduced: the company would have three sectors - Industry, Energy 
and Healthcare (see Exhibit 7). However, the change exceeded the number of sectors. 
Despite maintaining the scope of the company as an integrated technology company48, 
Siemens eliminated the Corporate Executive Committee of the Managing Board. Hence, 
each member of the new managing board was assigned a specific chain of command, 
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making the whole managing board responsible for the operational profit and loss of the 
corporation49. Also, the sectors would be split into divisions and these into business 
units. Every division and business unit would have its own CEO, which would lead the 
business worldwide50. The new structure allowed more transparency, faster decision-
making processes, less complexity51 and lower administrative and general costs.  
Moreover, the company also restructured its portfolio as it remained following Professor 
Pierer strategy regarding the market. Therefore, Siemens sold the VDO Automotive 
group to Continental AG52, it bought two companies to complement its healthcare and 
automation portfolios and it also discontinued part of its Communications business, the 
Siemens Enterprise Communications, which was not included in the joint venture with 
Nokia celebrated in the previous year: Nokia Siemens Networks.  
The three sectors were constituted by former groups of the company, enabling the 
organization to achieve its purpose: attain the leading position in each market 
addressed. 
It was also in 2008 that Siemens’s competitor in several businesses, General Electric, 
restructured its business, also simplifying its structure, decreasing the number of 
sectors from six to four53 (see Exhibit 8). 
 
Restructuring – Take 2: The Birth of a New Sector 
The goals of Siemens’s restructuring were met, as the organization was able to reduce 
its selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, having even reached the objective 
a year prior to the plan in 2009. However, 2008 turned out to be the beginning of the 
one of the darkest periods in the modern history for the economy, as it was the peak of 
the financial crisis, offsetting the potential of the new setup. In 2009, Siemens’s new 
orders and revenues behaved according to Peter Löscher’s predictions in the previous 
year, having registered a decrease of 16% in New Orders and 1% in Revenues54. 
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The economic situation completely shifted how to make business and where the 
greatest markets laid. Hence, Siemens believed that it was time to address new 
markets and explore new business models55. 
As the global economy was gaining a new structure, the former strong economics were 
suffering from the most severe crisis since post-war era while the businesses in the 
emerging economies, specially BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the 
Middle East, were soaring. With experts stating that it was likely these countries account 
for half of the world’s economic growth56, the once underdeveloped countries were at 
this point the epicenter of opportunities.  
Moreover, the topic of sustainability has always been key for Siemens. The 2009 G20 
summits in London and Pittsburgh strongly emphasized the subject, specially the 
balance of 3 factors: environmental stewardship, economic development and social 
responsibility57. Therefore, it became clear that the strategy for the next years would 
also have to carefully focus this topic. 
Thus, the strategy for the difficult times ahead for Siemens would concentrate two 
dimensions: the emphasis on emerging economies and on sustainability. With a 
presence of over a century in growing markets and a green portfolio that amounted €23 
billion for Siemens in 200958, Siemens seemed to be on the right track. Indeed, despite 
the severe economic environment Siemens was able to be successful in 2010. It 
achieved its best operating results ever, while increasing its New Orders by 3%. 
Concomitantly, there have been recognized emerging megatrends in the market by 
companies like Pricewaterhouse Coopers 59, McKinsey & Company60, Frost & Sullivan61 
among others. These megatrends comprise topics like demographics and the 
environment, but mostly, they emphasized the topic of urbanization, as cities seem to 
be a matter of concern in the future due to the numbers expected to be reached in the 
future as consequence of population growth. Indeed, about 400 cities in the world have 
more than a million people62, 60% of the population will live in a city by 203063 and 600 
cities will be responsible for about 65% of the GDP growth64. 
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Hence, in 2011, Siemens decided to implement a new sector: Infrastructure & Cities 
(IC)65. With this new sector, Siemens would be geared to tackle the 21st century 
megatrends, which the organization believed would be a driver of global demand66, 
while maintaining a frame to cope with the more immediate issues that crisis posed. 
Indeed, the company’s CEO promised to increase annual sales by a third to 100 billion 
euros67 through the creation of the fourth sector68. 
Through the merge of several existing Siemens’s business units and divisions into a 
single sector, the Infrastructure & Cities sector focused on everything a city needs to 
work properly: building technologies, solutions related to mobility and transportation and 
energy distribution. The organization took advantage of this decision to develop its 
already comprehensive portfolio of products and solutions69 in order to answer to the 
greatest challenges of the current and future generations. 
 
IC Strategies for a Sustainable Growth 
By 2012, in spite of having the lowest margin among Siemens’s sectors70, Infrastructure 
& Cities was already generating 17.585 billion euros in revenues, which accounted for 
22% of the company’s total and employing 89,000 people71. In addition, in September of 
the same year, the sector received the prize of the “2012 Global Frost & Sullivan 
Company of the Year Award for 'City as a Customer'”72 from Frost & Sullivan due to 
Siemens’s ability to recognize megatrends, turn them into opportunities and capitalize 
on them with customized and innovative solutions. 
However, unlike competitors like General Electric which grew 40% over the last couple 
years, Siemens’s shares have nearly stagnated73. The company’s profit margin in 2012 
was 9.5%, while competitors such as ABB or GE reached 10.3% and 15% 
respectively74. Indeed, the investments in the medical diagnostics specialist Dade 
Behring, and, to embrace and push the green strategy, Israel’s Solel Solar Systems and 
Archimede Solar Energy underperformed, resulting in millionaire losses and, ultimately, 
the closure of the solar business75.  
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With an extensive green and cutting edge portfolio, a global reach and a culture 
centered in the values of the company (Responsibility, Excellence and Innovation), 
Siemens’s believes that it is ready to answer the questions of our time. Whether the 
strategies of the corporation will lead to a sustainable growth, that is uncertain but one 
thing is for sure, in the words of the founder: “I won’t sell the future of my company for a 
quick profit”. The sentence with over a hundred years remains deeply rooted in the 
company’s strategy and beliefs. So, how will the 160-year old tale evolve? “200 and still 
growing” or “the history of the engineering powerhouse that was not able to keep up”? 
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Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 – The faces of Progress, the faces of Change – The family 
 
 Werner von Siemens 
- Founded, along with Johann Georg Halske, Siemens & Halske. 
- Responsible for significant progress in the field of electrical engineering 
- Discovered the dynamo-electric principal 
- Was in charge of several important large-scale projects that were vital for the 
company’s establishment in the market 
- Was ennobled by Emperor Friedrich III due to his accomplishments. 
 Wilhelm von Siemens, Sir William 
- Brother of Werner von Siemens 
- Developed the business internationally through his presence in England. 
- Carried out many relevant projects in England 
- Was a researcher and published articles while also being involved in several 
associations 
- Was knighted by Queen Victoria shortly before his death. 
 Carl von Siemens 
- The youngest brother of Werner von Siemens 
- Developed the Russian market, through major projects as the telegraph network  
- Was Senior Chief Executive in 1890’s of Siemens & Halske subsequent to the 
retirement of his brother Werner 
- Turned the company into a stock corporation 
- Was ennobled by Tsar Nicholas for his service to Russia. 
 Carl Friedrich von Siemens 
- Youngest son of Werner von Siemens 
- In charge of the company after World War I 
- Designed the strategy that guide the firm through Weimar Republic and National 
Socialist Regime 
- Strategy “Preserve the company’s universal scope within electric industry” 
- Reached leadership in the industry after 80% asset-loss due to the War. 
 Ernst von Siemens 
- Son of Carl Friedrich von Siemens 
- Played major role in the revitalization of the company after World War II 
- Was a member of the Managing Board of Siemens & Halske in 1943.  
- Was a full member of the Managing Board of Siemens-Schuckertwerke by 1948 
- For 10 years was Chairman of both companies. 
- Responsible for the merge of the companies into Siemens AG. 
- Was Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Siemens AG for 5 years. 
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Exhibit 2 – The faces of Progress, the faces of Change – The Chairmen of the 
Managing Board 
pppppppppppppppp Peter Löscher 
- Started his career in consulting. 
- In 1988 worked for Höchst Group, having held several management positions 
throughout Europe, Japan and U.S. 
- By 2000 was Chairman, President and CEO of Aventis Pharma. 
- In 2004 was President and CEO of General Electric Healthcare, while member of 
the Executive Board. 
- Two years later was President of Global Health at Merck & Co 
- Was hired for the position of CEO of Siemens AG. 
Pppppppppppppppp 
Klaus Kleinfeld 
- Began his career in a consulting firm in Germany 
- By 1986 was product manager of a company that merged into Novartis 
- Joined Siemens in 1987. Worked for Corporate Sales and Marketing Unit. 
- In 2011 was COO in U.S. and from 2002 to 2004 was CEO also in U.S. 
- Became CEO of Siemens AG in 2005 and resigned in 2007. 
Pppppppppppppppp 
Heinrich von Pierer 
- With previous experience as a Teaching Assistant in University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg, started his career at the legal department of the organization 
- Started to work solely for one of Siemens’s subsidiaries, Kraftwerk Union AG, in 
1977.  By 1989, became President of Kraftwerk Union AG. 
- Was president and CEO of Siemens AG from 1992 to 2005. 
- Became Chairmen of the Supervisory Board in 2005 but resigned in 2005. 
pppppppppppppppp 
Karlheinz Kaske 
- Joined Siemens in 1950 but left 3 years later to focus on the academic career 
- In 1960, returned to the company as Sales Engineer 
- In 1968, was a member of the planning department that formed Siemens AG 
- By 1975 was appointed member of the managing board, having become the 
Chairman in 1981. Hold the position for 11 years. 
 
Bernhard Plettner 
- Joined Siemens while in college, as Project Engineer 
- Helped to build the export business after the war 
- By 1962 was Chairman of Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG 
- Was a member of the joint presidency of the companies, but by 1971 he was 
appointed President and CEO of Siemens AG. 
- In 1981 become the first Chairman of the Supervisory Board not related to the 
Siemens family 
 
 
Gerd Tacke 
- Began his career at Siemens in 1932 
- Worked closely to Ernst von Siemens in Foreign Affairs and Sales Organization, 
as was also part of the group that merged the companies into Siemens AG. 
- Became the first Chairman of the Managing Board in 1968 unrelated to the 
Siemens family 
- By 1972 was a Member of the Supervisory Board. 
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Exhibit 3 – Siemens’s organizational structure in 196976	  
	  
Exhibit 4 – Siemens’s organizational structure in 198977 
 
 
Exhibit 5 – Siemens’s organizational structure in 200478
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  Engineering	   Electrical	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Exhibit 7 – Siemens’s organizational structure in 200880 
Exhibit 8 – General Electric’s Organizational structure before and after 
restructuring 
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After 
 
Exhibit 9 – Siemens’s Market Capitalization 
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Synopsis 
This case focuses on Siemens’s history. The centenary company was created in 1847 
by Werner von Siemens and Johann Georg Halske, who started the activity with the 
production of pointer telegraphs. Soon after opening doors, the company was already 
taking on big projects, propelling its international expansion. This way the company was 
able to increase its size, which was often supported by partnerships and consolidation. 
Throughout its history, Siemens faced many challenges that put its resistance to test. 
For instance, World War I, World War II and more recently the financial crisis assessed 
the ability of the company to respond to a difficult and uncertain market conditions. Most 
of these challenges demanded a fast response, otherwise the future of the company 
could be seriously compromised. As illustrated in the case study, Siemens response 
was often successful. 
In virtually 170 years of history, Siemens had many leaders who had an important role 
on the strategic direction of the company. The company had always been a family 
company, being headed by the founder’s relatives (i.e. the Siemens’s family). Yet, in 
1968, the first CEO unrelated to the Siemens family took the lead. Tacke worked, 
however, closely to the family for over 35 years. The situation was similar with following 
CEOs who had long careers in the companies before rising to the top. Nevertheless, the 
pattern changed in 2007, after the resignation of the CEO and Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board, when a new CEO who never worked for the company become in 
charge of the engineering giant. 
In a nutshell, this case describes the evolution of a small company of ten employees to 
a global corporation of almost 400,000. Particularly, the case revolves around the 
strategic decisions that were made in conflicted or transitional periods. Moreover, the 
topic of CEO turnover in the company is closely regarded due to its relevance for the 
topic of strategic change. 
The first section of the teaching case focuses on the history of Siemens until 2007, 
which is until the world financial crisis and before the entry of Peter Löscher. In this 
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section it is provided detailed description of the strategy of the company during this 
years, including the challenges faced with the world wars. 
On the other hand, in the second section the topic of CEO turnover is approached. 
From foundation to nowadays, every CEO is mentioned and thoroughly examined (i.e. 
academic background, experience outside and inside the company and tenure) in order 
to enable discussion about the topic. 
The last sections work as a continuation of the first, as they continue to tackle the 
history of the company but now with Löscher on the lead. Firstly, the major restructuring 
is arisen, occurred in the year of Löscher’s entry and also the beginning of the economic 
crisis. Second, the creation of a new sector is approached as well as the underlying 
rationale so as to provide an understanding of the strategy of the company. 
Teaching Purpose 
This teaching case is meant for students attending an Undergraduate or a Master 
Program in Business Administration, specifically at courses of general management and 
strategic management.  
In order to properly analyze the case, the student should be able to: 
§ Identify and analyze the main events that compromised the company’s 
sustainability in the market; 
§ Understand the role of resource reconfiguration for the success of Siemens; 
§ Understand the differences of being a promoted versus an outside CEO as well 
as the challenges associated with both; 
§ Recognize the influence of a former CEO as a board member. 
 
Intended Contribution 
The Siemens case aims to alert student to the need to closely monitor the market in 
order to respond in best possible way (as far as time, resources and circumstances 
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allow) in the case of the occurrence of an unpredictable event or shock, as Siemens 
faced situations that endangered its ability to remain in the market. 
In addition, it is intended that students understand the challenges associated with 
strategic change, specifically, in the case of CEO turnover, as Siemens went through 
significant changes since the beginning of the mandate of Peter Löscher, the first 
outside CEO of the firm. 
Instructor Preparation 
In order to be prepared to discuss the case, the instructor should get more acquainted 
with the theory and, thus, should read the following articles: 
§ Barreto, I. 2010, Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of Past Research and an 
Agenda for the Future, Journal of Management, 36: 256-280 
§ Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. 2000, Dynamic Capabilities: What are they, 
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1105-1121 
§ Zhang, Y., & Rajagopalan, N. 2009, Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO 
origin, strategic change, and firm performance, Strategic Management Journal, 
31: 334-346 
Besides the theoretical background, the instructor can also explore the history further in 
company website, especially the timeline, where the history is thoroughly explained. 
Also, the Ad Hoc Announcements of 2007 are a good source to grasp the chain of 
events in 2007. 
Moreover, the Press Releases “Siemens organizes operations in three sectors with a 
total of 15 divisions” and “Establishment of the Sector Infrastructure & Cities; planned 
IPO of Osram” provide detailed information on the restructurings. 
Finally, the presentations “New organization structure for Siemens” and “Infrastructure & 
Cities analyst call” consolidates strategic and financial information about the 
restructuring which can extend the scope of in-class discussion. 
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Suggested Assignment Questions 
1. Siemens has a long history of successes. However, there were also a few 
pitfalls. Identify the main shocks that Siemens faced throughout its history 
and the impact they had on the company. Elaborate on Siemens response to 
the shocks. 
The two requirements to answer this question properly is to clearly identify the shocks 
illustrated in the case, that is, the sudden situations who had a strong impact on the 
company in the external context, instead of mere strategic decisions put in place to 
improve company’s performance. Hence, there are 3 shocks: World War I, World War II 
and the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
World War I 
As far as the World War I is concerned, it was responsible for the collapse of the 
markets, the expropriation of the subsidiaries and loss of nearly all of the patent rights 
held abroad. The world disaster was responsible for a loss of 40% of the company’s 
capital. 
Siemens response to the tragic situation prioritized the manufacturing operations and 
recovery of the international business. Thus, Carl Friedrich von Siemens, who was in 
lead, design the following action plan: focus on the whole field of electrical engineering, 
while assigning specific areas of business to subsidiaries and affiliated companies. 
World War II 
As a German multinational company, World War II had a severe impact on the 
company. The reality of forced labor during the war reached Siemens and, during this 
period, 20% of the workers were working against their will. Besides, manufacturing 
plants were completely ruined and, although Siemens tried to respond during the war 
with the relocation of plants in 1944 and beginning of 1945, by the end of April, 1945, 
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the plants closed, the company’s infrastructures were ruined, causing a whopping loss 
of 80% of the company’s assets. 
Financial Crisis 
Nearly 65 years after, another shock takes place: the financial crisis. This situation 
started to affect the world in 2007 but it was only in 2009 that it started to have a strong 
impact on the company. 
Although 2008 was the peak of the crisis, Siemens was able to be successful and grow 
in a turbulent market and that was possible because it had a fast response to the 
occurrence with the 2008 restructuring, which enabled the firm to save a significant part 
of selling, general & administrative (SG&A) costs. In addition the solid business in key 
markets as Russia and China enabled the company to follow its solid performance. 
However, further action was needed. In spite of reaching the goal of the SG&A before 
the target, with Europe plunged in a severe recession, by 2009 Siemens was losing 
16% in new orders and 1% in revenues, and investments such as the acquisition of 
medical diagnostics specialist Dade Behring were struggling. With a focus on 
sustainability Siemens was able to improve its performance on fiscal year of 2010. Yet, 
it still was not enough. 
Siemens realized that in order to recover from this situation, it had to evolve according 
to the external context. Therefore, it emphasized the emerging countries, where at this 
point laid the best opportunities (due to the stagnation of the investment in many 
developed countries). Also, as most of this countries had massively populated cities or, 
due to its development, they were expected to have it soon, Siemens implemented the 
sector Infrastructure & Cities (which was an assembly of previously existing divisions 
with small acquired businesses). The purpose of this new sector was to answer to the 
needs of these cities, as it bundled the latest technology needed make a city geared to 
the future and challenges ahead. 
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Also, there was also an emphasis in the topic of sustainability and, hence, a stronger 
investment to be a “green infrastructure giant”, as Löscher stated at the time. The 
investments in Solel Solar Systems and Archimede Solar Energy were meant to be two 
important means to achieve the goals. However, these investments failed to meet the 
expectations, as they resulted in millionaire losses for the company. 
It is crucial that by the end of this question that the students understand the role of 
resource reconfiguration as a mean to sustain the competitive advantage of the 
company in the market. Indeed, it is paramount that students recognize that even 
though resource reconfigurations are vital they are not always successful. 
2. Consider the most recent shock. Analyze Siemens at the time according to 
Barreto’s four dimensions of Dynamic Capabilities. 
In order to fully accomplish the purpose of the question, the student should identify 
each of the 4 dimensions, assess each of them and provide an overall assessment of 
the dimensions. 
Propensity to sense opportunities and threats 
Students should realize that the company did an incomplete job in realizing the threat 
that the financial crisis constituted. It was in the peak of the financial crisis and at the 
start of the global recession that it started to take action by making the first 
restructuring. In addition, Siemens also realized that, even though the decision made 
previously was fulfilling the objective, it was not enough, so, the company continued to 
take action once again in 2011 with the creation of the Infrastructure & Cities sector. 
Also, it should be clear for students that Siemens was able to turn this threat into 
opportunities. The company realized that the financial crisis brought new business 
models and, mainly, new locations for business. With the BRIC countries and other 
emergent countries growing economically and demographically, Siemens realized that 
it would have to turn its attention to this new markets and provide solutions accordingly. 
Moreover, the recognition of Megatrends and the “2012 Global Frost & Sullivan 
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Company of the Year Award for 'City as a Customer'” constitute relevant evidence that 
company was indeed able to recognize opportunities. 
Nevertheless, it is imperative that the students identify that the company failed to 
estimate the impact of the implemented changes. On the one hand, the new sector has 
the lowest margin of all the sectors, which indicates an overreliance on the 
Megatrends. On the other hand, as the profit margin of the company is significantly 
lower than its competitors and its performance in the stock market has stagnated while 
the competitors’ has grown considerably, it is fair to consider that Siemens 
underestimated the threats of the environment and specially of the competition, which 
apparently was able to cope well with the shock that was the financial crisis. 
Propensity to make timely decisions 
At this point student can analyze each year individually. Students should understand 
that the first restructuring, in 2008, was made before the company actually 
experiencing the effect of the crisis on its activity, as it decided to prepare for the 
difficult times ahead implementing a restructuring that would provide a significant cut in 
costs. On the other hand, in 2009 the company saw its new orders and revenues 
decrease, even though the operational costs behaved according to the expectations. 
2010 was a year where Siemens had its best operational results and overall a good 
performance given the economic situation worldwide, as it started to focus on 
sustainability. This strategy was pursued in 2011 with the creation of the new sector 
and the revenues, profit and new orders continued to grow. 
However, there were some decisions whose timing may have been part of the reason 
why they have not met the expectations. The investment in Dade Behring in the 
beginning of the crisis was an example of a decision whose timing might have 
negatively influenced the investment. With more relevance to the analysis of this 
dimension is the investment in solar energy. These investments, that intended to 
increase the green portfolio of the company, were meant to make Siemens a partner of 
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companies and governments seeking a green approach. Although it is apparently a 
good strategy as the world seems to be evolving in that direction, the companies and 
governments were not ready yet to undertake such projects, especially with the 
economy struggling the financial crisis and consequent recession.  
Propensity to make market-oriented decisions 
In this dimension students should analyze the creation of the Infrastructure & Cities 
sector. It is essential that students understand that Siemens believed that the only way 
to stay competitive in the market was to increase its presence in the places where the 
opportunities now laid, that is the emergent markets, as a significant part of the existing 
clients were suffering the effects of the recession. However, that would not be enough. 
Siemens would have to increase its presence with the right products and the right setup 
to address these markets, hence, the creation of the Infrastructure & Cities Sector. This 
new sector assembled ever aspect related to electrical engineering that a city could 
possibly need to work smoothly. 
According to the Megatrends identified by the company, these countries would have 
overpopulated cities (due to the urbanization trends) and as there was a deficit of 
infrastructures, Siemens believed that as they were growing economically they would 
be at that point interested in investing in Siemens solutions. The new setup would 
facilitate large-scale businesses, as it would be easier to provide large-scale integrated 
solutions. 
The investments made in solar energy are also very relevant for this dimension. 
Siemens failed to make a good assessment of the market and made substantial 
investments in this area, generating a source of loss instead of revenue. Should 
Siemens make a better assessment, it would concentrate in core areas instead of 
enlarging an already extensive portfolio. 
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Propensity to change its resource base 
It is imperative that students recognize that this is the most relevant dimension for 
Siemens success. From the beginning Siemens realized that to be successful and 
remain competitive, it would have to reconfigure its internal structure, its portfolio and 
how it operated.  
As it is clear in the case study, Siemens is prone to try new structures so as to 
understand which provides better results and which is more adequate to the firm’s 
current situation. Therefore, the same rationale was applied during the 2008-2013 
period. Siemens merged the existing entities in three sectors (Energy, Industry and 
Healthcare) in an attempt to cut costs and it succeeded.  
On the other hand, the second structure intended to enable a more sustainable 
approach and a leaner access to the growing Infrastructure & Cities segment (at least 
in the emergent markets). Therefore, to the existing three sectors the IC sector was 
added. However, apart from a few investments made to complement the portfolio, 
former divisions of the other sectors constituted the new sector. The IC sector 
comprises complementary divisions (i.e. the potential for intra-sector business is very 
high), answering to the most pressing and numerous needs of the large cities in what 
infrastructures are concerned. 
To sum up, the individual and collective assessment is the following: 
D1. Propensity to sense opportunities and threats Medium 
Medium 
D2. Propensity to make timely decisions Medium-Low 
D3. Propensity to make market-oriented decisions Medium 
D4. Propensity to change its resource base Medium 
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3. Peter Löscher’s path in the company was different than its predecessors. 
What were the main differences? To what extent have those differences 
influenced the strategy adopted by the corporation? 
To answer the first part of this question, the students should focus on tenure in the 
company, experience, academic background and culture. Hence, it should be evident 
that Peter Löscher is different from the previous CEOs in almost every aspect 
mentioned.  
Unlike his antecessors, Löscher was Austrian and unknown in Germany, as he had 
never worked there. It was also in Austria that he took his economics degree, which was 
also fairly uncommon, given that the only CEO that had a similar academic background 
was the previous one: Klaus Kleinfeld. 
He had a remarkable career in the USA, where he worked for one of Siemens biggest 
competitors, the giant General Electric. There he was president of GE Healthcare (a 
direct competitor of Siemens) and member of the executive board. Also, Löscher held 
several positions in some of the most important pharmaceutical companies worldwide 
(e.g. President and CEO of Aventis Pharma, President of Global human Health at 
Merck & Co). 
However, the most important aspect that the student should identify is the fact that 
Peter Löscher was the first outside CEO, in other words, he had never worked in the 
company before becoming CEO. This situation was completely new for the company 
since the former Presidents were promoted CEOs: people that had long and 
outstanding careers, who due to there merit and proven quality to the company were 
able to rise to the top of the organization. 
In order to answer the second question, the students should essentially focus on tenure 
(even though the other aspects may have also exert a difference). 
As an outside CEO Löscher had a significant amount of work to do since he did not 
know the company and the people, so he had to become familiar and gain the trust 
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when the two people that were in charge, that everyone knew and trusted, left the 
company. However, with such a diversified working experience, he brought new ideas 
and a fresh perspective, which is a great advantage when companies have in place a 
mindset and ideas of people that have been working on the company for a long period 
of time and are often biased and unable to see farther. Thus, Löscher was prone to 
make bold changes in the company. 
Löscher’s vast experience played an important role in gaining the trust of his fellow 
board members as he took the risk of implementing a very dramatic change (the 2008 
restructuring) at such an early stage of his tenure. The seemingly good results of the 
first restructuring made him apt for another dramatic change. With the implementation of 
the Infrastructure & Cities sector and the implementation of the green/sustainable 
strategy, Löscher proved that he was not afraid of change.  
Students should conclude that as an outside CEO, Löscher was expected to make 
bigger and stronger changes than a promoted CEO, which is already acquainted to the 
company and prefers smaller changes. In addition, they should recognize that a 
common downside of outside CEOs is too much change, which is more likely to have a 
negative impact on the company. 
Teaching Plan 
Activity Duration 
Review of theoretical concepts  20 
Discussion of the teaching case 15 
Question 1 10 
Question 2 20 
Question 3 15 
Final considerations and conclusion 10 
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Discussion 
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The Siemens teaching case illustrates the challenges of Strategic Change and the 
difficulties that companies face in changing environments. 
In the centenary story of Siemens, one can find several situations that put the 
company’s resistance to the test. Indeed, the firms’ competitive advantage are 
increasingly harder to sustain as its longevity has been decreasing over time (Wiggins & 
Ruefli, 2005). The realization of the volatility of the markets caused the emergence of 
Dynamic Capabilities. 
According to Teece et al. (1997), dynamic capabilities are “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environment”. Hence, should one analyze Siemens’s strategic choices in light of this 
definition, the firm would have indeed dynamic capabilities which enabled it to sustain 
its competitive advantage. The restructurings, acquisition and strategic changes 
implement are a strong evidence of that. However, the company was not as successful 
as the theory suggests, hence, the importance of Barreto (2010) for the study of this 
case. 
Resource reconfiguration was Siemens’s response for many shocks, and it is at the 
core of Dynamic Capabilities as Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) considers. However, 
unsuccessful market-oriented decisions, which are crucial for superior competitive 
advantage (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993), undermined the potential of the internal 
restructurings of the company. 
Barreto (2010) considers “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically 
solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make 
timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base”. As the analysis 
in the teaching note showed, Siemens’s ability to sustain its competitive advantage can 
be classified as medium as its performance in the four dimensions of this 
multidimensional construct was not consistent, that is, within each dimension there were 
positive and negative aspects but also the relationship among the dimensions had also 
weak points, diminishing the probability of success. 
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As a case of strategic change, that can be defined as a shift in a single and specific 
dimension (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009), the analysis of CEO origin was considered 
paramount, as Siemens during this period had for the first time in its nearly 200 hundred 
years an outside CEO. 
Zhang & Rajagopalan (2009) realized that having an outside CEO versus an inside 
CEO differs the level of change and performance. In situations of low levels of strategic 
change, outside CEOs are more likely to be successful versus inside CEOs, while 
inside CEOs are more likely to prosper in the case of big changes versus outside CEOs 
(Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2009).  
The situation above reflects the fact that outside CEOs have new ideas, different 
experiences and are unbiased, being able to implement small positive changes in the 
company. However, they lack the inside knowledge of the company routine, people and 
positioning in the market which is crucial for big changes, making inside CEOs more apt 
for these. 
The new outside CEOs, besides having new skills, are more emotionally disconnected, 
have fewer concerns with the company status quo and, thus, more disposed to chase 
bold strategic directions. Therefore, there are more costs and risks associated with 
outside CEOs. 
Peter Löscher is a clear example of this situation as he started to make millionaire 
investments in the beginning of his tenure, which revealed to be a source of loss instead 
of revenue. Also, the choices he made in the context of the shocks were very bold 
changes, which not only undertook once, but twice, doing 2 restructurings in a period of 
three years time. Despite the positive performance of the company in reducing costs 
and expanding its reach, the changes did not translate into profits. 
Thus, the Siemens case illustrates perfectly the risks associated with hiring an outside 
CEO. Not only did Peter Löscher embrace large changes and bold decisions which 
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might have had a better outcome if they were implemented by a promoted CEO, but he 
incurred in a situation of too much change which derailed the company’s performance. 
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Conclusion  
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Dynamic capabilities endeavor to explain how to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage in rapidly changing environments. The Siemens teaching case illustrates the 
struggles of a centenary company in such an environment. The several situations that 
the company faced generated huge losses, propelling major resource reconfiguration, 
which lie at the core of the dynamic capabilities according to Eisenhard & Martin (2000).  
According to Barreto (2010), the definition of dynamic capabilities is a multidimensional 
construct in which, propensity to change resource base is a very important dimension. 
In addition, with great relevance to the case there is the propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, as Siemens was keen to identify opportunities in the context 
of the last shock that took place (which is the one that is deeply analyzed in the case) 
the financial crisis. 
In addition, the case analyzes the impact of the first outside CEO in Siemens history. 
This situation is often related with strategic change, as these leaders are prone to make 
large disruptive changes, as they bring brand new ideas and as they are less concerned 
with the company’s status quo. The Siemens case illustrates this situation perfectly as 
Mr. Löscher implemented two major restructurings and implemented a brand new 
strategy in his first years on the job, which generated both positive and negative 
outcomes. 
Strategic change is a very important topic for strategic management as it can ultimately 
determine the company’s success or failure and it is the intended intermediate outcome 
of dynamic capabilities. Thus, managers should be very attentive to the environment 
and the impact of their decisions in order to avoid compromise their competitive 
advantage. 
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